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Abstract. The Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) model is useful for building
reusable components that lead to rapid development of secure proto-
cols, especially for engineers working outside of the security community.
We work in the CK model and obtain a new secure authenticated key
transport protocol with three parties. This protocol is constructed with
two newly developed components in the CK model, thus extending the
power of the model.
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1 Introduction
A proof of security has become an essential statement for structural correctness of
new key establishment protocols. The first provably secure protocol was proposed
by Bellare and Rogaway [7] in 1993 with a two-party example. In 1995 they
extended their work to a three-party server-based key distribution protocol [8].
A feature of proofs in this model is that they are long and difficult to read for
the non-specialist, making them more error-prone. Another shortcoming is that
a minor change in the protocol requires a complete revision of the proof. There
is no easy way to reuse fragments of security proof.
In 1998, Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [4] proposed a new model for prov-
able security. The novelty of their work was its modular approach. This approach
uses layers for separated treatments for key exchange and authentication. In
comparison to the approach used in [8], this approach turns out to be easier
to understand because of its modularity. Moreover, it provides reusable build-
ing blocks for construction of new provably secure protocols. More precisely, a
module carrying a security proof can be reused for construction of new secure
protocols with other modules in the model that have been proven secure inde-
pendently. This work was later extended by Canetti and Krawczyk [9]; we refer
to this model as the CK model in this paper.
† Full version of this paper is available at http://sky.fit.qut.edu.au/boydc/papers/.
? Supported by ARC Discovery Project DP0345775.
Despite all advantages of the CK approach, there exists a limited number
of modules in the different layers. With limited number of reusable modules,
the full power of the CK approach cannot be seen. By increasing the number
of reusable modules, secure protocols with different requirements can easily be
constructed.
1.1 Motivation
A typical mobile network involves a network operator and mobile users. With ad-
vances in mobile technologies, independent application service providers (ASPs)
start providing services to the mobile users via their mobile devices. Mobile users
make payments to their respective network operators where funds are later trans-
ferred to the appropriate ASP. These activities need cryptographic protection
for security reasons. The typical methodology of achieving security for commu-
nications is to first establish a session key, then encrypt all subsequent messages
using the session key. Establishment of secure session keys was never an easy
task historically. With limited resources in mobile networking, it is even harder
to perform the task appropriately.
When considering the interactions between the three parties, network opera-
tor, mobile user and application service provider, it is easy to see that neither a
public key nor a symmetric key scheme alone is sufficient and efficient for estab-
lishing a session key between the parties. From the viewpoints of mobile users,
it is preferable to choose from a list of ASPs, thus implying the passive status
of the ASPs until a choice is made.
To solve this problem, let us assume that the network operator is trustworthy.
This assumption is justified in Sect. 4. Since users and the network operator
share symmetric keys in modern mobile networks, symmetric key cryptography
can be applied to this link. With sufficiently high computational power, public
key cryptography can be used by the network operator and ASP. Lastly, the
network operator generates the session key and sends it to the user. This is an
important setting for the sake of simplicity and providing the choice of ASPs
to mobile users. The choice of ASPs is important for protecting the privacy of
the user with regards to privacy policy. Note that this setting implies that the
session key is forwarded by the user to the ASP.
From our library of reusable modules, there exists no suitable modules in
the CK approach to address this real life application. Furthermore, there ex-
ists no suitable protocol in the literature of secure protocols for this particular
requirement. The lack of a suitable candidate is the main motivation for this
paper.
1.2 Main Contributions
We regard the following as the main contributions of this paper:
– A new key distribution protocol for applications in mobile networks;
– A new non-interactive MT-authenticator which does not generate additional
messages for authentication;
– Two new authenticated protocols with security proofs.
2 The Model
In the CK model the definition of security for key-exchange (KE) protocols
follows the tradition of Bellare and Rogaway [6], and is based on a game played
between the adversary and the parties P1, . . . , Pn. In this game, protocol pi is
modeled as a collection of n programs running at different parties P1, . . . , Pn.
Each program is an interactive probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) machine.
Each invocation of pi within a party is defined as a session, and each party may
have multiple sessions running concurrently. The communications network is
controlled by an adversary A, also a PPT machine, which schedules and mediates
all sessions between the parties. A may activate a party Pi in two ways.
1. By means of an establish-session(Pi, Pj , s) request, where Pj is another party
with whom the key is to be established, and s is a session-id string which
uniquely identifies a session between the participants. Note that session-id is
chosen by the adversary, with the restriction that it has to be unique among
all sessions between the two parties involved. This allows the delivery of
messages to the right protocol instantiation within a party.
2. By means of an incoming message m with a specified sender Pj .
A restriction on how the adversary activates parties exists depending on
which of the following two adversarial models is being considered.
– Authenticated-links adversarial Model (AM) defines an idealised adversary
that is not allowed to generate, inject, modify, replay and deliver messages of
its choice except if the message is purported to come from a corrupted party.
Thus, an AM–adversary can only activate parties using incoming messages
that were generated by other parties in pi.
– The Unauthenticated-links adversarial Model (UM) is a more realistic model
in which the adversary does not have the above restriction. Thus, a UM–
adversary can fabricate messages and deliver any messages of its choice.
Upon activation, the parties do some computations, update their internal
state, and may output messages which include the identity of the intended re-
ceiver. Two activated parties Pi and Pj are said to have a matching session if
they have sessions whose session-ids are identical and they recognised each other
as their respective communicating partner for the session. In addition to the
activation of parties, A can perform the following actions:
1. A may corrupt a party Pi at will, by issuing the query corrupt(Pi), and learn
the entire current state of Pi including long-term secrets, session internal
states and session keys. From this point on, A may issue any message in
which Pi is specified as the sender and play the role of Pi;
2. A may issue the query session-key(Pi, s), which returns the session key (if
any) accepted by Pi during a given session s;
3. Amay issue the query session-state(Pi, s), which returns all the internal state
information of party Pi associated to a particular session s;
4. A may issue the query test-session(Pi, s). To respond to this query, a random
bit b ∈R {0, 1} is selected. If b = 1 then the session key is returned. Other-
wise, return a random key chosen from the probability distribution of keys
generated by the protocol. This query can only be issued to a session that
has not been exposed, i.e. that has not been the subject of a session-state or
session-key queries, and whose involved parties have not been corrupted.
During the game, the adversary performs a test-session query to a party and
session of its choice. After that, the adversary is not allowed to expose the test-
session. A may continue with its regular actions with the exception that no more
test-session queries can be issued. Eventually A outputs a bit b′ as its guess on
whether the returned value is the session key or a random number, then halts.
A wins the game if b = b′. The definition of security follows.
Definition 1. A KE protocol pi is called SK-secure without perfect forward se-
crecy in the AM if the following properties are satisfied for any AM-adversary
A.
1. If two uncorrupted parties complete matching sessions then they both output
the same key;
2. The probability that A guesses correctly the bit b is no more than 12 plus a
negligible fraction in the security parameter.
The definition of SK-secure protocols in the UM is done analogously. The SK-
security is defined with or without forward secrecy. By distinguishing between
the AM and the UM, Canetti and Krawczyk allow for a modular approach to
the design of SK-secure protocols. Protocols that are SK-secure in the AM can
be converted into SK-secure protocols in the UM by applying an authenticator
to it. An authenticator is a protocol translator C that takes as input a protocol pi
and outputs another protocol pi′ = C(pi), with the property that if pi is SK-secure
in the AM, then pi′ is SK-secure in the UM. Authenticators can be constructed
by applying a message transmission (MT) authenticator to each of the messages
of the input protocol. Bellare et al. [4] and Canetti and Krawczyk [9] provided
three examples of MT-authenticators.
3 Definition of Security of Bi-encryption Scheme
In this section, we define the notion of security to deal with the case where sym-
metric and asymmetric encryption schemes are used for separate encryptions of
an identical message. We describe security in terms of indistinguishability [11]
under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) [5]. Let Π = (K, E ,D) be an en-
cryption scheme which consists of a key generation algorithm K, a probabilistic
encryption algorithm E and a decryption algorithm D. Let m0 be a message and
m1 ∈R {0, 1}|m0|. Let Acpa,E(·)Π be a polynomial time adversary against Π given
access to the encryption oracle E(·). Let κ be a security parameter. Security in
the sense of IND-CPA entails that an adversary cannot distinguish a ciphertext
C ← E(mb) where b ∈R {0, 1} with probability “significantly” more than 12 .
Let Π1 = {K1, E1,D1} and Π2 = {K2, E2,D2} be respectively a symmetric
and an asymmetric encryption scheme that satisfy indistinguishability under
CPA. We define the bi-encryption algorithm E∗ to be the execution of E1 and E2
such that on input a message m, it outputs two ciphertexts C1 ← E1(m), C2 ←
E2(m). We write {C1, C2} ← E∗(m) and refer to this particular setting as “Bi-
encryption”.
We denote the bi-encryption scheme Π∗ = {Π1,Π2}. Let Acpa,E
∗(·)
Π∗ be an
adversary attacking Π∗ with access to the bi-encryption oracle E∗(·).
Definition 2 (Security Notion of Bi-encryption in IND-CPA). We de-
fine the experiment of the attacking mode in the sense of IND-CPA:
Experiment ExpcpaΠ∗ (Acpa,E
∗(·)
Π∗ , b)
k ← K1(κ1), (e, d)← K2(κ2)
(m0,m1, s)← Acpa,E
∗(·)
Π∗ (find, κ1, κ2, e)
{C1, C2} ← E∗(mb)
z ← Acpa,E∗(·)Π∗ (guess, κ1, κ2, C1, C2, s)
Return z
The advantage of the adversary is defined as follows:
AdvcpaΠ∗ (Acpa,E
∗(·)
Π∗ ) = Pr[Exp
cpa
Π∗ (Acpa,E
∗(·)
Π∗ , 1) = 1]− Pr[ExpcpaΠ∗ (Acpa,E
∗(·)
Π∗ , 0) = 1]
The encryption scheme Π∗ is said to be secure under CPA if the function
AdvcpaΠ∗ (Acpa,E
∗(·)
Π∗ ) is negligible for every polynomial time adversary A1 in κ1
and A2 in κ2.
It is important to confirm that the notion of indistinguishability in encryption
algorithms is strong enough to also imply security in the bi-encryption. This
problem was addressed by Baudron, Pointcheval and Stern [2] and independently
by Bellare, Boldyreva and Micali [3]. Note that the proof by the latter is based
on a single public key encryption scheme using different keys.
Theorem 1 ([2]). If the encryption schemes Π1 and Π2 are secure under CPA,
then the encryption scheme Π∗ is secure under CPA. More precisely:
AdvcpaΠ∗ (Acpa,E
∗(·)
Π∗ ) ≤ AdvcpaΠ1 (A
cpa,E1(·)
Π1
) +AdvcpaΠ2 (A
cpa,E2(·)
Π2
) (1)
The actual result in [2] considers only asymmetric encryption schemes. How-
ever, their result is also applicable to any combination of symmetric and asym-
metric encryption schemes as long as the equivalent notion of security is satisfied.
4 A New Protocol Secure in the AM
We propose a key distribution protocol in the AM where two parties use a
trusted server for session key generation. This protocol uses both symmetric and
asymmetric encryption. There is a need for this type of setting, particularly for
business in mobile networks. We explain why.
The typical setting in mobile networks involves a network operator and users
with a mobile device. A third player in mobile networks is the ASP which pro-
vides services to users and gets payment from users via the network operator.
Typically, they do not share a long term secret key. Thus it is required to setup
a secure communication channel between them before any sensitive data could
be exchanged. The secure communication channel is constructed with a session
key generated by the network operator given that both the users and the ASPs
trust the former. The trust on the network operator is reasonable because the
basic telecommunications services are provided by the network operator.
When determining the mechanism for setting up the session key, we consider
two links: the link between the users and the network operator and the link be-
tween the network operator and the ASPs. Since users in mobile networks share
a long term secret key with the network operator for basic telecommunications
services, it is natural to use a symmetric key encryption scheme on this link.
It is also the best choice for the users due to the constraints in computation of
mobile devices. On the link between the network operator and the ASPs, we use
an asymmetric key encryption scheme. We have two reasons for this decision.
Firstly, it is reasonable to assume that both the network operator and the ASPs
are capable of running computationally intensive algorithms. Secondly, it is dif-
ficult to securely distribute long term secret keys to all ASPs, thus limiting the
use of symmetric encryption schemes on this link.
Let S be the network operator, U be the user and A be the ASP. The sequence
of the communications link is: U → S → U → A. Note that the link between
the network operator and the ASPs has been broken down to two links where
U relays messages from S to A. This setting allows the users to choose different
ASPs based on their preferences.
Assume that U shares a long term secret key kUS with S. Let (eX , dX) be
the public and private key of party X. The session key is encrypted with the
long term secret key shared between U and S. On the link between A and S,
public key cryptography is employed. Let σ ← Sn(1κ) be a session key generated
by the key generator Sn(1κ) with security parameter κ. We denote Ek(m) be
encryption of some message m under key k. Similarly, Dk(c) denotes decryption
of some ciphertext c with key k. The protocol is shown in Figure 1.
Remark 1. We note the importance of the session identifier s. It is used to match
concurrent sessions running by protocol participants, thus its value must be
unique such that probability of the appearance of the same value twice is neg-
ligible. A practical implementation for uniqueness of the session identifier is to
enforce contributions s1, s2 from both parties. Each party then knows that the
session identifier is fresh and unique.
S U A
σ ← Sn(1κ)
µU ← EkUS (σ)
µA ← EeA(σ)
A, s, µU−−−−−→
U, s, µA−−−−−→
U, s, µA−−−−−→
σ′ ← DkUS (µU ) σ′′ ← DdA(µA)
Fig. 1. The Protocol 3PKD
Theorem 2. Let Π1 be the symmetric encryption scheme and Π2 be the asym-
metric encryption scheme used in protocol 3PKD. The protocol 3PKD is SK-
secure in the authenticated links model (AM) if the encryption schemes Π1 and
Π2 are secure under chosen plaintext attacks.
Proof. Since the protocol 3PKD is a key distribution protocol, it is easy to see
that both parties U and A are in possession of the same session key upon the
completion of the protocol execution and therefore satisfies the first condition
of SK-security in Definition 1. Note that uncorrupted parties behave according
to the protocol specification. This proof concentrates on proving the second
condition of the SK-security.
Let Π∗ be the bi-encryption scheme constructed from Π1 and Π2. Let A
be an adversary against the protocol 3PKD. Let ² be the advantage of A in
distinguishing between a session key and a random value of the same length. We
show that if ² is non-negligible, then at least one of Π1,Π2 can be broken, thus
reaching a contradiction.
For simplicity, message routes are modified such that A has a direct link with
S. That is, the routes are now: S → U, S → A. We stress that this alteration
does not affect the security of the protocol, as messages from S to A can always
be forwarded by U if necessary.
We construct an algorithm X to break Π∗. It runs A as a subroutine. Let
k∗ ← K1(κ1) be the symmetric key and (e∗, d∗)← K2(κ2) be the pair of asym-
metric keys used in 3PKD. Following Definition 2, X first computes σ0 ← Sn(1κ)
and σ1 ∈R {0, 1}|σ0|. The challenges that X receives are a pair of ciphertext
(µ∗U ← Ek∗(σb), µ∗A ← Ee∗(σb)) where b ∈R {0, 1}. Resources available to X are
the public key e∗, access to the bi-encryption oracle E∗(·) = (Ek∗(·), Ee∗(·)) and
the session key generator Sn(·). X then proceeds as follows:
1. Machine X sets up a virtual scenario for the run of protocol 3PKD and
activates A against the virtual run. The adversary A has control of the com-
munication channels and schedule of all operations. The scheduled operations
are performed by X on behalf of all virtual players in the virtual scenario
for the run of protocol 3PKD. Virtual player include server, user and service
provider. The simulation takes into consideration of the possession of keys
of different parties.
2. At setup stage of the virtual protocol run, X chooses randomly a server
S∗ from all possible servers (S1, . . . , Sn) in the virtual run of the protocol.
Similarly X chooses randomly a user U∗ and a service provider A∗ from
a list of imitated users (U1, . . . , Uu) and service providers (A1, . . . , Aa) re-
spectively. We use n (resp. u and a) to denote the maximum number of S
(resp. U and A) that can be invoked in the virtual protocol run. Since mul-
tiple sessions are possible amongst the chosen parties (S∗, U∗, A∗), X picks
s∗ ∈R {1, . . . , l}, where l denotes the maximum number of sessions between
the chosen parties, as its guess on which A will choose as the test session.
That is, the chosen session by X is (S∗, U∗, A∗, s∗).
3. All long-term symmetric keys and asymmetric key pairs are chosen by X
except for the case of U∗ and A∗. X provides A with all public keys for all
service providers Ai 6= A∗. The input public key to X , e∗, is used as the
public key of A∗.
4. All session establishments are executed by X according to the protocol spec-
ification except the chosen session. Whenever a session s 6= s∗ is invoked by
A, X runs Sn(1κ) to obtain a session key σi. If U∗ is not involved in the
session s, encryptions of the session key can easily be computed because of
the complete knowledge of the long term keys. If U∗ is involved in the session
s, X accesses the encryption oracle (C1, C2)← E∗(σi) and returns C1 as the
encryption of σi for U∗. This simulation is perfect from A’s point of view. If
S∗ is activated for establishing a session between U∗ and A∗ at session s∗,
X sends µ∗U and µ∗A to U∗ on behalf of S∗ and sends µ∗A to A∗ on behalf of
U∗.
5. All exposures against session s 6= s∗ can be answered by X with its knowledge
of keys except for exposures against S∗, U∗ or A∗. If a session reveal is
scheduled against the session s∗, a corruption against U∗, A∗ or S∗, or a
different test session (Si, Uj , Ak, s) 6= (S∗, U∗, A∗, s∗) is chosen by A, X
aborts the run of A and outputs a bit b′ ∈R {0, 1} as its guess on b.
6. If A queries the test session s∗, X returns (µ∗A, µ∗U ) to A. We stress that no
exposure against the test session (S∗, U∗, A∗, s∗) can be performed after the
test key is returned.
7. If A halts and outputs a bit b′, then X halts and outputs the same bit.
By runningA as a subroutine, X can break the bi-encryption schemeΠ∗ with
overall probability 12 +
²
l·n·u·a . This is derived from the probability (l ·n ·u · a)−1
that A chooses the correct test session and the probability of guessing correctly
the bit b when A is aborted. The advantage ²l·n·u·a is non-negligible.
By Theorem 1, the maximum advantage of the adversary attacking the bi-
encryption schemeΠ∗ under CPA is the sum of the advantages of the adversaries
attackingΠ1 andΠ2. IfΠ∗ can be broken under CPA with non-negligible advan-
tage, then at least one of Π1,Π2 can be broken with non-negligible advantage.
This contradicts our assumptions in Theorem 2.
5 New Authenticator
5.1 A Non-interactive Signature Based MT-authenticator
We propose a non-interactive signature-based MT-authenticator λTimeSig that uses
time stamps to provide freshness. In contrast to the original signature–based
MT–authenticator of Bellare et al. [4], our new MT-authenticator results in only
one message in the UM for every message to be authenticated.
Using time stamps for freshness requires synchronisation in time. In practice,
maintaining perfect synchronisation is extremely expensive and is not commonly
used for communications between clients and servers. Thus, we need to accept
“loosely synchronised” times for the scheme to be practical. In addition, the time
stamp is required to be unique. The uniqueness is maintained by the procedures
for signature verification.
Time stamps could be in different formats [14, 13], but we provide an abstract
formulation for our needs. We assume that there exists a secure time server T S
which we model as a universal time oracle available to all parties. All parties
access this oracle whenever a time stamp is required. We also assume that there
exists a boolean function V which returns TRUE or FALSE on input a time
stamp Υ . If it returns TRUE, then the time stamp Υ is fresh. Otherwise, Υ is
expired. Note that this function may make decisions based on some “looseness”
in time if necessary.
Let I be an initialisation function which invokes, once for each party, the key
generation algorithm of a signature scheme secure under chosen message attacks
with security parameter κ. Let Sig and Ver denote the signing and verification
algorithms. Let ski and pki be the private and public keys of a party Pi where
all public keys pki are known by all other parties. Whenever Pi needs a time
stamp, it requests the time oracle T S(·) for a time value.
The MT-authenticator λTimeSig is activated within some party Pi with an ex-
ternal request to send a unique message m to party Pj . Then λTimeSig invokes a
two-party protocol λTS that proceeds as follows. Since λ
T
S involves only two par-
ties, we use A and B for their identities. Party A sends ‘signature:SigA(m,ΥA, B)’
to B and outputs ‘A sent message m to B’. When ‘signature:SigA(m,ΥA, B)’ ar-
rives at party B, B accepts m if the signature is successfully verified as described
below. If m is accepted by B, B outputs ‘B received m from A’. This type of
transmission is captured in Figure 2.
A B
SigA(m,ΥA, B)−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 2. Signature Based MT-authenticator using Time stamps
Remark 2. Our representation of the signature makes no assumption on its na-
ture. In the case of a signature scheme with message recovery, only the signature
is sent. In the case of a signature scheme with appendix, the messages signed
and the signature are sent together.
For ensuring the security of λTimeSig , B needs to maintain a list L of received
and accepted messages by all instances run by B. Party B maintains this list with
two operations, namely insertion and deletion of records. Let n be the maximum
number of records in L. A record li∈{1,...,n} = (m′, Υ ′A) is added to L when m′
is accepted by B such that B outputs ‘B received m′ from A’. The record li is
removed from L when its associated time stamp Υ ′A has become invalid.
Upon receiving the message SigA(m,ΥA, B) from A, party B proceeds to
execute the signature verification procedures as follows. Firstly B recovers the
data (m,ΥA, B) from the signature and searches for an identical time stamp
from its list of records L. If an entry is found, then m is rejected. If not, B
verifies the signature using the signature verification algorithm VerpkA(m,ΥA).
If the signature is invalid, then m is rejected. Otherwise, B runs V to determine
whether the time stamp is freshly generated. Party B only acceptsm if V returns
“TRUE”.
Remark 3. Counters could be used to replace time stamps for freshness for
our new MT-authenticator. Replacing time stamps with counters is straight-
forward [1] and the resultant MT-authenticator is also non-interactive. The se-
curity proof of λTimeSig can easily be modified to suit the MT-authenticator that
uses counters. The main difference in the proof is the mechanism used to verify
freshness of messages.
Security Proof We now proceed to show that the protocol λTimeSig is a valid
MT-authenticator which emulates an MT-protocol in the UM. An MT-protocol
refers to the transmission of a single message flow while emulation follows the
convention of Ballere, Canetti and Krawczyk [4]. Assume that the signature
scheme is secure under adaptive chosen message attack in the convention of
Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [12] and is thus existentially non-forgeable.
Theorem 3. Assume that the signature scheme in use is secure under adaptive
chosen message attacks. Then protocol λTimeSig emulates protocol MT.
Proof. The proof follows the general technique in the security proof of an MT-
authenticator using random nonces [4] and appears in Appendix A.
5.2 From MT-authenticator to Authenticator
Our new MT-authenticator λTimeSig can be made into a full-fledged authenticator
using Theorem 4 as follows.
Theorem 4 ([4]). Let λ be an MT-authenticator such that λ emulates mes-
sage transmission MT in unauthenticated networks, and let Cλ be a compiler
constructed based on λ as described above. Then Cλ is an authenticator.
Depending on the number of message flows in the AM, a full-fledged authen-
ticator can be a combination of MT-authenticators. If there is a single message
flow in the AM, a MT-authenticator is sufficient to be used as an authenticator.
Otherwise, two or more MT-authenticators need to be combined for transforming
different message flows in the AM. We stress that Theorem 4 implies authenti-
cation of a single message and puts no restriction on how the other messages of
the same AM protocol are authenticated, thus is independent of the number of
messages or participants.
A New Authenticator for Three Party Protocol As an example for gen-
erating a full-fledged authenticator to transform a two-message AM protocol to
a protocol secure in the UM, we recall a MAC-based MT-authenticator [9] and
combine it with our signature-based MT-authenticator using time λTimeSig . Other
types of MT-authenticators exist, but the choice of λMAC is necessary to sat-
isfy the unique requirements of the AM protocol of Figure 1. The MAC-based
MT-authenticator is shown in Figure 3 and is referred to as λMAC hereafter.
A B
m−→
m,NB←−−−−
m,MACkAB (m,NB , B)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 3. MAC Based MT-authenticator
We combine the MT-authenticators λMAC and λTimeSig for a secure transfor-
mation of protocol 3PKD. It is also applicable to other AM protocols with two
message flows with the respective computational requirements. The full-fledged
authenticator CλMAC
λTimeSig
is illustrated in Figure 4.
S U A
rU ∈R {0, 1}κ←−−−−−−−−−
mU ,MACkUS (mU , rU , U),
SigS (mA, ΥS , A)−−−−−−−−−−−→
SigS (mA, ΥS , A)−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 4. A Full-fledged Authenticator derived from λMAC and λ
Time
Sig
Note the disappearance of the first message in CλMAC
λTimeSig
from S to U . This
message is not required as the MT-authenticator λMAC can be simplified to two
message exchanges since the first message m from A to B is redundant.
6 Secure Protocols in the UM
In this section, we demonstrate the applications of our new modules in the CK
model. First we show a secure three-party key transport protocol in the UM.
Then we show an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
6.1 An Authenticated Key Transport Protocol
Using CλMAC
λTimeSig
, we show that protocol 3PKD of Figure 1 can be compiled into
a secure protocol in the UM. More precisely, we compile our new three-party
key distribution protocol 3PKD of Figure 1 with CλMAC
λTimeSig
to obtain a secure key
distribution protocol in the UM. We denote by ΥS ← T S an action that S
obtains a time from the time server to generate the time stamp. Let a||b be
the concatenation of a and b. The resultant secure protocol following the above
procedures is shown in Figure 5 and is named 3PKDUM.
S U A
rU ∈R {0, 1}κ←−−−−−−−−−
σ ← Sn(1k)
µU ← EkUS (σ)
µA ← EeA(σ)
ΥS ← T S
s = rU ||ΥS
A, s, µU ,MACkUS (A, s, µU , rU , U)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
SigS (U, s, µA, ΥS , A)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
SigS (U, s, µA, ΥS , A)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 5. A Key Transport Protocol Secure in the UM
The session identifier s in 3PKDUM is a simple concatenation of rU and ΥS .
The ASP A gets assurance of freshness because the checking process ensures that
no time stamp is accepted twice. Even though U does not check the freshness of
ΥS , and A cannot check the freshness of rU , the combination of these values is
unique. In practice, of course, only one copy of each value is required.
6.2 An Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange using Time
Stamp
To further demonstrate the advantage of our new MT-authenticator, we con-
struct an authenticator based solely on λTimeSig . This authenticator is then applied
to the ordinary Diffie-Hellman key exchange [10] to obtain an authenticated
Diffie-Hellman key exchange in the UM. Assume that the session identifier s is
known by A and B before the run of the protocol. Then we simply apply λTimeSig
to each of the messages of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, then combine the
results of these applications. Note that the ordinary Diffie-Hellman key exchange
was proven SK-secure in the AM [9]. The authenticated Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change using time stamps is illustrated in Figure 6 and is named 2DHTUM.
A B
ΥA ← T S
x ∈R Zq y ∈R Zq
SigskA(A, s, g
x, ΥA, B)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ΥB ← T S
SigskB (B, s, g
y, ΥB , A)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
K′ = (gy)x K = (gx)y
Fig. 6. Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange using Time Stamps
It is worth noting that the message flows are not required to be sequential.
That is, the protocol 2DHTUM is a one-round protocol. In comparison, the
authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange [9] by applying the original signature
based MT-authenticator in the CK model requires three rounds to complete.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we defined a notion of security for encryptions of an identical
message using one symmetric and one asymmetric encryption scheme. We then
constructed a new three-party key transport protocol satisfying this notion of
security in the AM.
We designed a new non-interactive MT-authenticator using time stamps from
which a new authenticator was generated. This authenticator is used to translate
AM protocols to secure protocols in the UM. We also discussed a variant of the
MT-authenticator using counters.
From the new authenticator presented in this paper, we constructed a se-
cure protocol 3PKDUM of Figure 5 as well as an authenticated Diffie-Hellman
exchange of Figure 6.
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A Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Let U be a UM-adversary that interacts with λTimeSig . We construct an
AM-adversary A such that the outputs of running U in the UM and running A
in the AM are equally distributed except with negligible probability. AdversaryA
runs U as a subroutine on a simulated interaction with a set of parties running
λTimeSig . Note that adversary U interacts with some imitated party A′ in the
unauthenticated networks while adversary A interacts with some imitated party
A in the authenticated networks.
In the imitated run of the protocol, A first chooses and distributes keys
for the imitated parties according to function I. When setup is completed, the
interaction runs according to the following rules:
1. Whenever U activates some imitated party A′ for sending a messagem to im-
itated party B′, adversary A activates party A in the authenticated network
to send m to B.
2. When some imitated party B′ outputs ‘B′ received mˆ from A′’, adversary A
activates party B in the authenticated-links model with incoming message
mˆ from A.
3. Whenever U corrupts a party,A corrupts the same party in the authenticated
network and hands the corresponding information (from the simulated run)
to U .
4. Finally, A outputs whatever U outputs.
It is easy to verify that the behaviour of A is legitimate model except for
step two. In step two, it is possible that party A is uncorrupted and the message
(mˆ,A,B) is not currently in the set of undelivered messagesM. More precisely,
it is the case where B′ outputs ‘B′ received mˆ from A′’, but either A was not
activated for sending mˆ to B, or B has already had the same output before
(mˆ,A,B) expires. This case indicates that U broke party A′. We denote this
event by B.
If step two can always be carried out such that B does not occur, then it
is clear that the simulation run by A is perfect and the output of A and U
is equally distributed. Thus, we need to show that event B occurs only with
negligible probability ²(κ) where κ is the security parameter.
To prove the negligible probability of occurrence of event B, we construct a
forger F that breaks the signature scheme with probability ²(κ)/p where p is
the number of parties. The forger F runs U on a simulated interaction with a
set of parties running λTimeSig with input a public key pk
∗. Access to a signing
oracle O(Sigsk∗(·)) is allowed for modelling adaptive chosen message attacks.
Note that the private key sk∗ is not known by F and that F runs U in the same
way as A runs U . It then proceeds as follows:
1. F chooses and distributes key pairs (pki, ski) where i ∈ {1, . . . , p} for the
imitated parties according to function I, with the exception that the public
key with a randomly chosen party P ∗ is replaced with the input key pk∗.
2. If U corrupts party P ∗, then F fails and aborts the simulation.
3. If F is required to sign some value l on behalf of some imitated party Pi 6=
P ∗, F generates the signature using its knowledge of the private key ski.
When party P ∗ is required to sign some value l, F asks its signing oracle
O(Sigsk∗(l)) to obtain a valid signature.
4. If some party Q outputs ‘Q received m from P ∗’, where P ∗ was not activated
to send m to Q or Q has already output this value before, F is successful in
breaking the signature scheme and outputs the signature in the last incoming
message that Q received.
First note that U ’s view of the interaction with F is identically distributed
to U ’s view of a real interaction in an unauthenticated network unless F fails
and aborts the simulation. Let B∗ be the event where B occurs in the simulated
run of U within F , and that the party broken by U is P ∗. Note that if event B∗
occurs, F does not fail. If F fails, event B∗ does not happen. Thus the probability
of failure in the simulation run by F is at least ²(κ)/p because of the random
choice of P ∗.
Assume that event B∗ occurs. The occurrence of event B∗ implies that the
signature that Q received in its last incoming message is a valid signature of the
value (m,ΥP∗ , Q), but P ∗ never generated this particular signature.
Two cases were identified that might have happened corresponding to event
B∗. First, P ∗ was not activated to send m to Q. Second, Q has already had the
same output before. In the first case it is clear that if P ∗ was not activated to
send m to Q, P ∗ never signed the message.
If Q outputs the same value twice before the time stamp associated with
the first m has expired, then the signature that Q received in its last incoming
message is valid and fresh such that it was signed with sk∗ and on input the
signature V returns ‘TRUE’. However, recall that Q maintains L where accepted
messages and their respective time stamps are stored, no messages together with
the same time stamp are repeated in L. It follows that P ∗ only sent m once and
thus only signed the signature once where the time stamp was different to the
time stamp in the last signature that Q received. Recall again that P ∗ generates
a new time stamp with each new message, the time stamp in the last signature
that Q received was not generated by P ∗. Therefore F (on behalf of P ∗ for
signatures) has only asked its signing oracle once. As a result, F never asked its
oracle for the last signature.
Consequently, F has successfully broken the signature scheme.
Remark 4. In fact it is possible that Q outputs the same value twice or more
times referring to records that are not in the current set of records in L. If
the sender sends the same message m many times, Q will accept m provided
the time stamp is fresh and unique, and the signature is valid. Note that time
stamps from the same sender are different for different messages.
